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Overview of the Term:

The Rule of Law & Roberts's
Revolution of Restraint
Douglas W. Kmiec*
The October Term was a notable one, less for any singular case, than for
the landmark passages that took place on the Court: a new Chief Justice for
the first time in close to twenty years and the addition of an Associate
Justice for the first time in over a decade. The initial proceedings in this
symposium will examine the substantive work of the Court: criminal justice,
civil rights, law and politics, the separation of powers, and the business and
commerce cases. This will be followed by a second panel of distinguished
journalists who will evaluate the confirmation proceedings which yielded the
Court's new membership, specifically, what questions were asked, whether
any were answered, how the process might be improved, and what also
might be said about the public coverage of the confirmation.
A PATHBREAKER

RETIRES: A BELOVED CHIEF JUSTICE DIES IN OFFICE

The beginning of the Roberts's Court really starts with an ending: the
"surprise" retirement of Sandra Day O'Connor in advance of the seriously
ailing William Rehnquist who tenaciously held to his place on the Court
until life's end. Sandra O'Connor and William Rehnquist learned the law
together as Stanford classmates. It was William Rehnquist who brought
O'Connor to President Reagan's attention for the Court, and it was Sandra
O'Connor who steadfastly joined Rehnquist in his effort to right the federalDuring their service together, O'Connor-who had a
state balance.
deserved reputation as the Court's center-also generally had her highest
voting affinity with William Rehnquist. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor gave important new life to a jurisprudence that answered
questions and solved problems, even as they parted company on the
implication of a non-textual abortion right and differed on the use of race for

* Professor of Constitutional Law and Caruso Family Chair, Pepperdine University School of
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diversity. It is fair to infer that O'Connor heightened Rehnquist's sensitivity
to gender discrimination and that Rehnquist influenced O'Connor's
thinking, at least in part, toward greater religious accommodation and the
protection of private property.
Now JOINING THE LINE-UP: JOHN ROBERTS AND SAMUEL ALITO
The statistical reviews of the Roberts-Alito Rookie Year confirm it to be
a continuation of the center-right tradition of the Rehnquist-O'Connor era.'
Like Rehnquist and O'Connor, Roberts and Alito exhibited a high voting
affinity-agreeing close to 90% of the time. 2 They have a common origin,
entering public life as young Justice Department lawyers in the Reagan
administration. They share an attitude of judicial humility, a desire for
judicial consensus, and an abiding respect for law as written and
prospectively applied. As suggested herein, these elements-humility,
unanimity, and fidelity to the written law-shaped the first year of the
Roberts's Court.
Roberts's Rookie Year also featured a veteran infielder who plays at
many ideological positions: Justice Kennedy. Because Justice Kennedy's
vote was the fifth in some controversial matters, a few public commentators
suggested it was more a Kennedy than Roberts's Court.3
There is a plausible case to be made for this, but there is a counter-point
as well. Knowing Justice Kennedy, he might well be the first to rebut the
popular theory simply out of humility.
But the pundits have also

exaggerated Kennedy's solo influence premised both upon the previous,
formidable pairing of O'Connor and Kennedy and perhaps an inability to see
beyond the Court's past partisan divisions.
Kennedy without O'Connor is Garfunkel without Simon or, even more
classically, Rodgers without Hammerstein.
Paul Simon and Oscar
Hammerstein wrote lyrics that made songs both memorable and
understandable. O'Connor had a comparable gift for creative expression,
even as originalists sometimes wondered if she was always reading from the
Founders' constitutional songbook. For better or worse, it was O'Connor
who had to be satisfied. It was her "reasonable objective observer" who
would cast a suspicious eye at public religious displays. 4 And it was her
assessment of the University of Michigan's practices that allowed racial
1. See Bob Egelko, Kennedy - The New Point Man; No Surprisesfrom Bush's Appointees, S.F.
CHRON., July 2, 2006, at Al (noting that the "administration's hopes for a rightward shirt on an
already-conservative court were largely checked" by Justice Kennedy).
2. Id. (citing statistics compiled by Georgetown University Law School).
3. See, e.g., Charles Lane, All Eyes on Kennedy in Court Debate on Abortion: Justice Expected
to be Swing Vote in Ruling on Late-Term Procedure,WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2006, at A03 (noting that
Justice Kennedy was expected as the swing vote in many cases including the late-term abortion case
recently heard by the Court).
4. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2746 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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diversity to be a factor in admissions.5 Kennedy, like Art Garfunkel or
Richard Rodgers, would often join O'Connor's lyric with an accompanying
melody. But it was her words that bound the duo and their compositions
together.
Kennedy and O'Connor both concluded, for example, that it was wrong
for Texas to single out for criminal punishment, private, consensual
homosexual practice. 6 But it was O'Connor's separate concurrence that
made sense of the judgment, pointing out that it violates equality for a state
to punish unmarried intimacy between people of one sexual orientation, but
Despite a troubling lack of deference to state law,
not the other.7
O'Connor's rationale was at least anchored in the equal protection text of the
Constitution while Kennedy's was hanging somewhere in mid-air exploring
"spatial and transcendent" liberties. 8 O'Connor's rationale was sufficient to
keep the homosexual plaintiff John Lawrence and his partner out of a Texas
jail; 9 Kennedy's expansive musings to this day provoke litigation to allow
same-sex marriage.
In writing her down-to-earth lyric for the Court, O'Connor was
pragmatic; as an explorer of the spatial heavens, Kennedy was more poetic.
Commentators, including myself, would occasionally express frustration
with O'Connor's balancing tests that only she could apply, but at least she
decided the particular, and often sensitive, case before her. Kennedy's
decisions are indeterminate. Having taught law for more than twenty
years,' 0 he sees all kinds of potential permutations, and is quite content to let
them percolate unresolved, like provocative questions posed during an
academic seminar. This is a tolerable trait for a professor, but it is a less
helpful quality in a judge. Kennedy's theorizing reveals a mind of great
intelligence, but makes it more difficult to strike bargains with him.
O'Connor knew what she wanted as a specific outcome, so the liberal and
conservative coalitions could make reasonable bids for her affections.
Kennedy, as a solo act, poses the perennial Father's Day dilemma: you know
the old man needs something, but darned if you can put your finger on it.
Kennedy's ruminations produce cases that have outcomes, but no settled
rationale. Thus, the scope of the Clean Water Act remains a mystery,

5. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003).
6. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
7. Id. at 577-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
8. Id. at 562.
9. Id. at 578-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
10. Justice Kennedy taught Constitutional Law at the McGeorge School of Law, at University of
the Pacific from 1965 to 1988. The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2006).
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beyond Kennedy's requirement for some as-yet-undefined "significant
nexus" to U.S. waters;' 1 the exclusionary rule does not apply in no-knock
cases,' 2 but it should not be seen as "in doubt"; and Guantanamo detainee
Mr. Hamdan deserves a tribunal more jurisprudentially spiffy than the
President's military commissions because of the influence of the Geneva
Convention, 13 even as Justice Kennedy claimed it was "not necessary to
decide" how to apply the Convention. Whistling improvised tunes can be
exhausting even for Kennedy. In rejecting Vermont's campaign spending
and contribution limits, Kennedy expressed fatigue and simply directed
readers to look up his earlier "skepticism" of the campaign finance "legal
universe," and left it at that without elaboration. 14
If Kennedy by manner and approach chooses to do-si-do rather than lead
the judicial dance, who then emerges as the dominant influence on the
Court? By virtue of seniority (and sheer intellectual feistiness), Justice John
Paul Stevens, eighty-six, is the organizing voice of the four-vote liberal view
(himself, Breyer, Souter, Ginsburg). But last year, and likely into the future,
most of Stevens's writing was in dissent. Of course, when the Chief is
recused, this charming, unpredictable thinker chairs the internal conference,
and anything and everything can happen, as it did in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. 5
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, of course, remain the
rock-solid right, and while two can tango, the number is insufficient to
decide cases. Many will see Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito as a bloc.
Yet, that oversimplifies the human dynamic of the Court. Roberts has a
conservative mind, but a diplomat's nature. His abiding concern is to keep
the Court within bounds on legal, rather than, ideological grounds. Because
that is so, he has the capacity to draw votes from both sides on controversial
and pedestrian cases alike. Consider just two examples: his unanimous
opinion rejecting free speech and association claims against Congress's
Solomon Amendment mandating equal campus access for military
recruiters, 16 and his opinion for the full Court rejecting, on procedural
grounds, a challenge to tax credits favoring in-state investment. 7 Roberts's
collegial consensus-building here, and elsewhere, overwhelmed Kennedy's
ability to deploy his swing vote. The impact of the new Chief Justice was
especially influential because he and Justice Samuel Alito, the newest
addition to the Bench, share the founding vision of a more limited role for
the Court.
11. See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2226-27 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
12. See Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2178 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
13. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2759-60 (2006).
14. See Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2501 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
15. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2749.
16. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1305-07,
1312 (2006).
17. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1859-63, 1868 (2006).
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The fractious finale of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, invalidating the President's
military commissions, obscures more than it reveals, because there, Roberts
was sidelined by recusal and unable to urge his colleagues toward
consensus, or at least a more carefully-tailored and clearly-stated, not to
mention succinct, opinion. Roberts's ability to influence Justices across the
spectrum of ideas suggests that the most apt modifier for the Court is neither
Kennedy nor Roberts, but open-minded. The strengthening of this quality
for the Nation's highest tribunal ought not to be missed by outworn efforts
to pigeon-hole the Court by partisan label or to perpetuate a cult of
personality.
THE FRAGILE REHNQUIST LEGACY

No assessment of a rookie year would be complete without the context
of the previous season. In his final innings, William Rehnquist lost some of
the hard earned constitutional advantages on the bases of religious
accommodation, federalism, and the protection of property rights.
THE FIVE COMMANDMENTS

It is fair to associate the Rehnquist legacy with greater accommodation
of religious belief, but in the final Term in which he served, the Ten
Commandments were allowed in one place but not another, and so to some
degree, religious accommodation became a more muddled subject. Five
commandments might be allowed everywhere: Who knows?
The Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, which Rehnquist
personally sought to clarify with a masterful historical summary in dissent in
Wallace v. Jajffee,' 8 remained in his final year still mired in considerations
of how to apply the ill-fitting Lemon' 9 test or the highly subjective
O'Connor theory of no endorsement. Lemon's purpose prong provides that,
in order to be valid, government action must have "a secular . . . purpose,"
language that has generally been interpreted as permitting government action
unless there was no secular purpose or if the proffered secular purpose was
merely a sham. ° However, in McCreary County v. ACLU,2 a closely
divided Court held that the display of the Ten Commandments in a county
courthouse was an unconstitutional establishment of religion because the
display was originally motivated by a religious purpose and that
18.
19.
20.
21.

472 U.S. 38,91(1985).
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 108 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
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government's secular purpose must "predominate. 2 2 This led Justice Scalia
to argue in dissent that the Court had imposed a "heightened requirement"
under the purpose prong. 23 As invalidated by the Court, the display was
denominated a "Foundations of American Law and Government Display"
and the government's expressly-stated purpose of depicting "documents that
played a significant role in the foundation of our system of law and
government., 2 4 The Court's new purpose requirement leads to a more
searching inquiry into legislative motives under Lemon v. Kurtzman.25
Justice Breyer joined the majority opinion in McCreary County, but
provided the critical fifth vote upholding a Texas Ten Commandments
display in Van Orden v. Perry,26 decided the same day. In Texas, "the
tablets have been used as part of a display that communicates not simply a
religious message, but a secular message as well, '27 Justice Breyer wrote in
his opinion concurring in the judgment, noting that "[t]he circumstances
surrounding the display's placement on the capitol grounds and its physical
setting [among other, non-religious monuments] suggest that the State itself
intended the latter, nonreligious aspects of the tablets' message to
predominate. 28 It also appears that if the government changes its position
out of concern that its initial purpose or motivation was too religious, the
government may be confessing unconstitutionality, from which there can be
no judicial redemption. In McCreary County, Justice Souter, writing for the
Court and joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held
that the display of the Ten Commandments in a county courthouse was an
unconstitutional establishment of religion because the display was originally
motivated by a religious purpose. 29 After the suit was filed, the county
legislative body adopted a resolution calling for a more extensive display of
significant documents in American history, including a central passage from
the Declaration of Independence announcing the "self-evident truth" that all
people are "endowed by their Creator"; the preamble to the Kentucky
Constitution ("We, the people of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, grateful
to Almighty God . . . ."); the national motto ("In God We Trust"); and the
Mayflower Compact. 30 When the district court held the expanded display
unconstitutional, the County expanded the display yet again, this time to
include, alongside the Ten Commandments, "framed copies of the Magna
Carta, the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, the lyrics of the

22. Id. at 2745.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
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Id. at 2757 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 2758-59 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
Id. at 2870 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2736.
Id. at 2729-30.
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Star Spangled Banner, the Mayflower Compact, the National Motto, the
Preamble to the Kentucky Constitution, and a picture of Lady Justice," in a
collection titled "The Foundations of American Law and Government
Display."' 3 The district court enjoined that display, too, holding that it still
had a religious purpose in light of the "history of [the] litigation., 32 A panel
of the Sixth Circuit affirmed over the dissent of Judge Ryan, who denied that
the prior displays should have any bearing on the constitutionality of the
third one.33 The Supreme Court affirmed, five to four, rejecting, in light of
the litigation history, the County's claim that the purpose of the third exhibit
was "to educate the citizens of the county regarding some of the documents
that played a significant role in the foundation of our system of law and
government. '' 34 The Court recognized, though, that one consequence of its
inquiry into the purpose of "past actions was that the same government
action may be constitutional if taken in the first instance and
unconstitutional if it has a sectarian heritage," suggesting that Kentucky's
third display may have been constitutional had it been erected first. 3 5
This is not a body ofjurisprudence that builds confidence.
State Immunity
New exceptions were crafted with respect to the application of Eleventh
Amendment Sovereign Immunity. This was a doctrine very close and dear
to the heart of the late Chief Justice, but in the last Term that he served and
in this first Roberts's Term, the Eleventh Amendment was noticeably
trimmed in application. For example, the categorical statements in Seminole
Tribe36 and Alden 3 7 that Article I power does not include subjecting
nonconsenting States to private lawsuits was subsequently qualified in
Central Virginia Community College v. Katz.3"

31. Id.at2730-31.
32. ACLU v. McCreary County, 145 F. Supp. 2d 845, 849 (E.D. Ky. 2001).
33. ACLU of Ky. v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438, 477-78 (6th Cir. 2003) (Ryan, J.,
dissenting).
34. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2731.
35. Id. at 2737.
36. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (holding that under the
Constitution's Eleventh Amendment, absent state consent to be sued, the Indian Commerce Clause
does not grant Congress the power to abrogate a state's immunity from suit in federal court).
37. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that "the powers delegated to Congress
under Article I of the United States Constitution do not include the power to subject nonconsenting
States to private suits for damages in state courts").
38. 126 S. Ct. 990 (2006).

Katz involved an action by a bankruptcy trustee to set aside preferential
transfers of a bankrupt's assets in favor of the state. In a five to four
decision, Justice Stevens held that the suit was not barred by sovereign
immunity, even though Congress's bankruptcy power derives from Article
L39 In part, the majority's reasoning rested upon the in rem nature of
bankruptcy which the Court repeated from prior precedent "does not
implicate state sovereignty to nearly the same degree as other kinds of
jurisdiction."4 ° But the majority wrote more broadly in Katz that the
Bankruptcy Clause "reflects the States' acquiescence in a grant of
congressional power to subordinate to the pressing goal of harmonizing
bankruptcy law sovereign immunity defenses that might have been asserted
To make this more sweeping statement, the
in bankruptcy proceedings.'
majority had to disavow dicta that had assumed that sovereign immunity
would be capable of assertion in bankruptcy cases. "[T]hat assumption,"
said Justice Stevens, "was erroneous. 42 To demonstrate the error, the Court
pointed to early difficulty posed by "wildly divergent" state laws on
bankruptcy, which yielded judgments of discharge that would sometimes not
be recognized in a sister state. 43 "[T]he history of the Bankruptcy Clause...
shows that the Framers' primary goal was to prevent competing sovereigns'
interference with the debtor's discharge .

.

. .

Early congressional

legislation granted a habeas right against the states
[T]o redress the rampant injustice resulting from States' refusal to
[T]he Sixth Congress'
enactment of a provision granting federal courts the authority to
respect one another's discharge orders ....

release debtors from state prisons ... was understood to carry with

it the power to subordinate state sovereignty, albeit within a limited
sphere. 45

Justice Thomas dissented for Chief Justice Roberts as well as Justices
Scalia and Kennedy. Thomas begins his dissent with an effort to characterize
the Stevens opinion as a concession that at least "does not appear to question
the established framework for examining the question of state sovereign
immunity under our Constitution., 46 Justice Stevens and others in the Katz
majority had consistently criticized Seminole Tribe and its reliance upon the
Hans' theorem that "[u]nless ... there is a surrender of [state] immunity in

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
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Id. at 994, 1003.
Id. at 995.
Id. at 996.
Id.
Id. at 997.
Id. at 1002.
Id. at 1004.
Id. at 1006 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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the plan of the convention, it will remain with the states ....
It remains,
of course, to be seen if, in fact, Justice Stevens is now accepting of that
theorem - at least outside bankruptcy. The dissenters thought bankruptcy no
exception to the general rule. Quoting Seminole Tribe, Justice Thomas
reiterated his view that "'[t]he Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial
power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the
constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.' 48 The dissent
argued that the majority in Katz ran together two distinct legal points. That
a state is denied power to enact bankruptcy provisions by Article I does not
mean that the state is also subject to being sued by private citizens. "These
two attributes of sovereignty often do not run together - and for purposes of
enacting a uniform law of bankruptcy, they need not run together., 49 Said
the dissent:
[N]o historical evidence suggest[s] that the Framers or the early
legislatures, even if they were anxious to establish a national
bankruptcy law, contemplated that the States would subject
themselves to private suit as creditors under that law. In fact, the
historical record establishes that the Framers' held the opposite
view.5 °
The dissent pointed out that the availability of habeas relief does not support
the majority since it is a suit against a state official allowed under Ex parte
Young 51 and not against the state itself.5 2 The inability to enforce sister state
judgments, reasoned Justice Thomas, dealt with the need for uniformity,
satisfied by the power itself, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and not
the abrogation of state immunity. Finally, that bankruptcy is in rem (and
conclusive over the property in the control of the court) does not resolve the
issue of whether an ancillary suit may be brought against the state to recover
property already in the hands of the state.53 Concluded Justice Thomas:
It would be one thing if the majority simply wanted to overrule
Seminole Tribe altogether. That would be wrong, but at least the
terms of our disagreement would be transparent. The majority's

47.
48.
72-73
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1007 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
(1996)).
Id. at 1008 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1010 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 168 (1908).
Katz, 126 S. Ct. at 1011 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1012 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

action today, by contrast, is difficult to comprehend. Nothing in the
text, structure, or history of the Constitution indicates that the
Bankruptcy Clause, in contrast to all of the other provisions of
Article I,
manifests the States' consent to be sued by private
54
citizens.
While Justice Thomas was protective of the states' immunity in Katz, he
was of no mind to extend it beyond the states to county governments. In
Northern Insurance Co. of New York v. Chatham County, Georgia,55 Justice
Thomas wrote for a unanimous Court that an insurer that indemnified a
private citizen whose vessel was damaged by the county's malfunctioning
drawbridge could recover from the county. 56 Under circuit court precedent,
the county was not treated as an "ann of the state," and that being so, there
was no residual immunity of unknown provenance that shielded the
county. 57
States have immunity by virtue of their pre-ratification
sovereignty which counties lack, and thus, "this Court has repeatedly refused
to extend sovereign immunity to counties.""
Finally, the Court again considered the issue of state liability under the
ADA in United States v. Georgia.5 9 Georgia dealt with Title II of the ADA,
which deals with discrimination against the disabled in public programs.60
In Georgia, the public program was the state prison, and prisoner Tony
Goodman, a paraplegic inmate, alleged that he was housed in such a narrow
cell that he could not turn his wheelchair around without assistance, that
often assistance was not forthcoming forcing him to spend long periods in
his own waste, and that he was deprived of medical attention and other
prison services. 6' Goodman sued under both Title II and the general civil
rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages and injunctive relief
against the state and its department of corrections.6 2 Justice Scalia wrote for
a unanimous Court finding that Goodman had alleged conduct that, if
proven, would potentially violate not just Title II, but the Eighth
Amendment's guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment.63 The
possibility of an actual constitutional violation made the case more
straightforward than the Garrettdecision 64 since:

54. Id. at 1014 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
55. 126 S. Ct. 1689 (2006).
56. Id. at 1695.
57. Id. at 1692.
58. Id. at 1693.
59. 126 S. Ct. 877 (2006).
60. Id. at 878.
61. Id.at 879.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 880-81.
64. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001) (holding that the
Eleventh Amendment bars suits by state employees against the state for failing to comply with the
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Congress is expressly granted authority to enforce . . . the
substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment [which
incorporates the Eighth] by providing actions for money damages
against the States. . . . Thus, insofar as Title II creates a private
cause of action for damages against the States for conduct that
actually violates the Fourteenth 6Amendment,
Title II validly
5
abrogates state sovereign immunity.
Justice Scalia was careful to admonish the lower court on remand, however,
to differentiate where conduct violated Title II, but not the Constitution, and
to determine whether Congress successfully abrogated state immunity as to
that discrete class of conduct.66 In short, the Court left for another day
whether Title II of the ADA is a sufficient abrogation. Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg wrote a separate concurrence that suggested there might be
constitutional violations in Goodman's allegations beyond the Eighth
Amendment - such as denial of access to the judicial process or denial of
procedural due process. 6 7 The concurrence is obviously intended to incline
the Court to find Title II to be a sufficient abrogation and provision of
section five prophylactic remedy in light of the significant set of rights
theoretically affected in the treatment of the disabled in public programs.68
The Commerce Power
The late Chief Justice's efforts to limit the commerce power might be
said to have gone up in a puff of medical marijuana. The scope of the
commerce power was raised only indirectly in Roberts's Rookie Year and it
triggered one of the new Chief Justice's rare dissents, or at least his
willingness to join a dissent of Justice Scalia. 69 The scope of the commerce
power is much debated with serious consequences for the balance between
state and federal power - a broad conception of federal commerce power
limits state authority, while construing the commerce power narrowly leaves
more discretion to the states. 70 As mentioned, Gonzales v. Raich7' found the
intra-state use of medicinal marijuana prescribed by a doctor pursuant to

ADA).

65. Georgia, 126 S. Ct. at 881 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976)).
66. Id. at 882.
67. Id. at 884 (Stevens, J., concurring).
68. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
69. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 926 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. See Douglas W. Krmiec, Rediscovering a PrincipledCommerce Power, 28 PEPP. L. REv. 547,
559 (2001).
71. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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state law nevertheless to be subject to federal prosecution under the
Controlled Substances Act ("CSA").7 2 In Gonzales v. Oregon,73 the primary
issue was whether the Attorney General had authority to declare assisted
suicide an illegitimate medical practice and to prevent doctors from using
controlled substances to accomplish it.7 4 While the majority (Kennedy,
Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) found the CSA not to
reach intra-state assisted suicide as a matter of statutory and regulatory
interpretation, 5 Justice Scalia and the new Chief would have deferred to the
exercise of federal power.76 Justice Thomas in dissent would have deferred,
too, but more grudgingly.77 In his dissent, Justice Thomas writes:
[I]n stark contrast to Raich's broad conclusions about the scope of
the CSA as it pertains to the medicinal use of controlled substances,
today this Court concludes that the CSA is merely concerned with
fighting 'drug abuse'. . . . The majority's newfound understanding
of the CSA as a statute of limited reach is all the more puzzling
because it rests upon constitutional principles that the majority of
the Court rejected in Raich [-the states'] "traditional police powers
to define the criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of their citizens."7"
Thomas would have found for state authority in both cases, but he dissents
in Oregon as a matter of stare decisis, respecting what he believes was the
mistakenly broad conception of federal power in Raich to sustain the
Attorney General's federal directive. 79
MISLEADING LABELS

It is fashionable, though I think unilluminating, to toss around liberal
and conservative labels about the Justices. This usage merely perpetuates
the mistaken view that the members of the Court are necessarily outcome
driven and that no one on the Court is capable of following the law as
written. Justice Thomas is popularly labeled a judicial conservative, for
example, and his preference for state over federal authority is principled and
consistent. His willingness in Gonzales v. Oregon to follow precedent
against his principled federalism 8° would be singled out by some

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

506

Id. at 33.
126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
Id. at 911.
Id. at 925.
Id. at 926 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 939-41 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 940 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Id. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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conservatives as laudatory, and by others, as treachery (i.e., preferring
incorrect judicial opinion to constitutional text and original meaning).
Even in a political sense, the partisan labeling is foggy. Attorney
General Ashcroft is also described as a conservative, so why then is he so
eager to displace the states? It might be argued that there are two competing
conservative principles in play: respect for state authority versus respect for
the unalienability of human life. Justice Scalia touches on this question in
his Gonzales v. Oregon dissent:
The Court's decision today is perhaps driven by a feeling that the
subject of assisted suicide is none of the Federal Government's
business.
It is easy to sympathize with that position. The
prohibition or deterrence of assisted suicide is certainly not among
the enumerated powers conferred on the United States by the
Constitution, and it is within the realm of public morality (bonos
mores) traditionally addressed by the so-called police power of the
States. But then, neither is prohibiting the recreational use of drugs
or discouraging drug addiction among the enumerated powers.
From an early time in our national history, the Federal Government
has used its enumerated powers, such as its power to regulate
interstate commerce, for the purpose of protecting public moralityfor example, by banning the interstate shipment of lottery tickets, or
the interstate transport of women for immoral purposes.... Lottery
Case . . . (1903). Unless we are to repudiate a long and wellestablished principle of our jurisprudence, using the federal
commerce power to prevent assisted suicide is unquestionably
permissible. The question before us is not whether Congress can do
this, or even whether Congress should do this; but simply whether
Congress has done this in the CSA. I think there is no doubt that it
has. If the term "legitimate medical purpose" has any meaning, it
surely excludes the prescription of drugs to produce death.81
Like Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia thinks the regulation of assisted
suicide lies outside federal power as an original, textual understanding of the
Constitution, but as a matter of precedent, the exercise of federal power over
drug use has come to be accepted.82 Perhaps with two new members, the
Court can take up the issue of when judges have an obligation to correct the
mistakes of past opinions. The Supremacy Clause might well be viewed as

81. Id. at 939 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
82. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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supplying a different answer than the one Justice Scalia gave if, that is,
supremacy includes respecting that which is within and without the scope of
enumerated authority given to the federal government. If Justice Scalia is
right that the regulation of morality (bonos mores) has traditionally been a
state matter, it seems odd to argue, as he does, for deference to federal power
on the subject. There is a good case, of course, that the state law authorizing
assisted suicide contradicts the First Principles of the American republic
(persons created equal with an inalienable right to life), and that the
Declaration of Independence trumps the Supremacy Clause, but Justice
Scalia does not understand the judicial role as appropriately opining on the
objective truth of the human person.83
Putting high theory aside, it is standard doctrine that when federal and
state power compete over the same topic, there is a problem of "preemption." Justice Scalia, in his dissent for himself, Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Thomas, claims that the Attorney General's Directive would not
have conflicted with Oregon law.84 Is that true? Oregon permits assisted
suicide; the federal government, by the Directive, precludes it. Justice
Scalia says that is not a conflict since the Directive merely prohibits what the
state law allows. 85 There would only be a conflict, he says, if a state
required assisted suicide.86 That is a sufficient argument to address conflict
preemption understood as impossibility, but it understates the type of
conflict preemption premised on frustration of purpose. In truth, it would be
interesting to know if any member of the Court understands frustration of
purpose as running in two directions and not just when the state law is said
to frustrate a federal objective. As some of the oral argument in Oregon
suggested, if the Attorney General took away controlled substances, the state
objective of facilitating suicide would be far more difficult and perhaps
painful. 87

83. Douglas W. Kmiec, Natural Law Originalism - Or Why Justice Scalia (Almost) Gets It
Right, 20 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 627 (1997); Douglas W. Kmiec, The Human Natureof Freedom
and Identity- We Hold More Than Random Thoughts, 29 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 33 (2005).
84. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 934 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Directive merely interprets the CSA to prohibit, like
countless other federal criminal provisions, conduct that happens not to be forbidden under state law
(or at least the law of the State of Oregon).").
86. id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Directive does not purport to pre-empt state law in any
way, not even by conflict pre-emption - unless the Court is under the misimpression that some States
require assisted suicide.").
87. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006) (No. 04-623),
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/04-623.pdf.
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PROPERTY UNTOUCHED

In his last Term, the late Chief Justice Rehnquist saw the constitutional
protection of private property also diminished. In the area of eminent
domain, there was the transmutation of "public use" into "private use for
economic development" in the very controversial Kelo v. City of New
London88 case. A less well remembered opinion was Lingle v. Chevron, 9
where the standard of review matching means and ends for land use cases
became far more deferential and approving of regulation. Mercifully, the
Roberts's first year gave property a respite.
It was thus unfortunate reality that as the late Chief Justice was clinging
to life, and as the first year of his successor got underway, the Rehnquist
legacy to some degree was already eroding. Instead of Rehnquist's clarity,
the religion clauses remained cloudy; state sovereign immunity was less
robust, and federalism was a sometime thing, with the Commerce Clause
seemingly back for all-purpose duty, except that the states might prevail
when a federal official over-reaches.
William Rehnquist served on the Supreme Court of the United States for
thirty-three years. 90 He served as Chief Justice for ninteen of them. 91 May
he rest in peace.
MEET THE NEW PLAYERS

So who are the new members? Garrison Keillor described John Roberts
this way:
Mr. Roberts has a good story. A boy grows up in Indiana, which is
a disadvantage, but he overcomes it by hard work and clean,
purposeful living.
He learns how to excel without offending
anybody, which is a great and rare art, and he ascends to the ivyclad citadel of Harvard, and he rises through the ranks-managing
editor of the law review, Supreme Court clerk, job at the White
House-and he plows forward ....
Political labels don't quite stick

88. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
89. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
90. Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, http://www.supremecourtsus.gov/
members.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2006). William Rehnquist was appointed to the Court on January
7, 1972. He was elevated to Chief Justice on September 26, 1986 and his service ended on
September 3, 2005. Id.
91. Id.

to him; friends of various stripes have only good things to say about
him. He is cool. 92
Roberts is cool and he has a good mind-and judicial humility (a quality
not always associated with the Supreme Court) was on display from the
beginning. He told us in opening statement:
Judges and justices are servants of the law, not the other way
around. Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules;
they apply them.
The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure
everybody plays by the rules. But it is a limited role. Nobody ever
went to a ball game to see the umpire.
Judges have to have the humility to recognize that they operate
within a system of precedent, shaped by other judges equally
striving to live up to the judicial oath.
And judges have to have the modesty to be open in the decisional
93
process to the considered views of their colleagues on the bench.
In year one, Roberts was faithful to this view. And darn if he isn't
reconfiguring the Court as "the least dangerous branch" by in some ways
making it the least interesting one. Marcia Coyle takes up the confirmation
process later, but it was clear that some Senators, reflecting the prodding of
interest groups, were anxious to have Roberts opine on one political issue or
another, be it abortion or the war on terror. These are vitally important
topics to be sure, but as John Roberts made plain in his answers, they are for
us, the people, and the elected delegates we have sent to the House and
Senate and state assemblies, to address.
JUST CASES PLEASE - "STANDING" ON THE SIDE WITH THE LAW

The role of a judge is intended to be limited-the resolution of specific
cases-requiring interpretative skill and respect for enacted text and
precedent, but most of all a commitment to maintaining those legal doctrines
and landmarks which keep the powers of government separate. This can be

92. Garrison Keillor, The Inexorable Ascent of A Harvard Man, THE OLD SCOUT (July 26,
2005), available at http://prairiehome.publicradio.org/features/deskofgk/2005/old_scout/08/02.
shtm.
93. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be ChiefJustice of the
United States: HearingBefore the S. Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G.
Roberts, Jr.).
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arcane lawyerly stuff, but Madison knew, as we
94 do today, that dividing
power prevents its abuse and ensures impartiality.
Back in 1993, when John Roberts was not in public office and was
outside searching national scrutiny, he was invited to participate in an
administrative law discussion in the Duke Law Journal. No one blowing the
dust off this academic volume will find Robert's thinking on partial birth
abortion or same-sex marriage or any of the other matters that make
What will be found, however, is 95a fair-minded lawyer's
headlines.
commitment to observing the doctrine of standing.
Standing, as first year law students leam, qualifies one to bring a case to
court. 96 The courthouse was never envisioned as a locus for all purpose
problem-solving, but the disposition of "cases or controversies" where
someone who has suffered tangible injury can seek the redress the law
permits. But let then-counselor Roberts speak for himself:
Standing is an apolitical limitation on judicial power. It restricts the
right of conservative public interest groups to challenge liberal
agency action or inaction, just as it restricts the right of liberal
public interest groups to challenge conservative agency action or
inaction. It precludes Congress from assigning a right to sue to
those without injury whether the statutory interest sought to be
judicially enforced is perceived as liberal or conservative. The
relatively recent growth of conservative public interest groups, and
the even more recent change in presidential administrations, should
set the stage for rethinking the facile assumption that standing
cloaks a political agenda. It does derive from and promote a
conception that judicialpower is properly limited in a democratic
society. That leaves greater responsibility to the political branches
of govemment-however they are inclined. To the extent that is a
political agenda, it is the one the Framers enshrined in the
Constitution. 97
This respect for constitutional structure and democratic choice is not simpleminded majoritarianism. The founders secured individual rights from free
speech to private property not just by dividing power, but by articulating
express limits or prohibitions on the power so divided.

94. JAMES MADISON ET AL., The FEDERALIST No. 48 332-38 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
95. John G. Roberts, Jr., Article II Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DuKE L.J. 1219, 1230-31

(1993).
96. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1442 (8th ed. 2004).
97. Roberts, Jr., supra note 95, at 1230-3 1.

Much of the Senate's questioning confused who is judge and who is
legislator. John Roberts shared none of that confusion in the hearings or his
first year.
Take as an exemplar case of Roberts's humility: DaimlerChryslerCorp.
v. Cuno,98 speculated to be a major dormant commerce challenge to
investment tax credits. An Ohio law reduces a company's corporate
franchise tax liability in amounts tied to the purchase of "new manufacturing
machinery and equipment" that is installed in the state of Ohio. 99 The Sixth
Circuit found that to violate the dormant Commerce Clause as
discriminatory against out of state commerce. 0 0
There was precedent supporting the Sixth Circuit view. Many previous
cases have found taxes that appear innocuous on their own to discriminate
against interstate commerce when working in connection with another
statutory implement such as a tax or subsidy. In West Lynn Creamery, Inc.
v. Healy, 101 all raw milk sold by dealers to Massachusetts retailers was
taxed; but then the proceeds from that tax were distributed to in-state dairy
farmers. Maryland v. Louisiana102 had the state of Louisiana placing a first
use tax on natural gas and then using various tax credits and exclusions to
benefit in-state suppliers. In both instances, the Court struck down the
statutes because they benefited in-state producers to the detriment of out-ofstate producers and had no justifiable reason other than economic
protectionism. 103
There have also been several cases where a tax was ruled
unconstitutional because it was based upon activities conducted outside the
state. The state of New York, in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully,' 04
was assessing a tax on corporations based on the relative proportion of
exports they had within the state; meaning the business they conducted in
New York could remain the same, but the tax would increase if business
increased outside the state. 10 5 Similarly, it was found discriminatory for
exemptions from taxes to be provided only to non-profits operating
principally for the benefit of residents of the state in Camps
1 06
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison.
Now, it is possible to distinguish those cases. The Ohio investment tax
credit is not working in concert with any other statute to benefit those that
invest in-state, while at the same time assessing a penalty on those that do

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

126 S. Ct. 1854 (2006).
Id. at 1859.
See Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2004).
512 U.S. 186 (1994).
451 U.S. 725 (1981).
Id. at 757-58; West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 192-96.
466 U.S. 388 (1984).
Id.at 391-94.
520 U.S. 564 (1997).
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not. As mentioned above, the investment tax credit is available to anyone
interested in building a plant or locating new equipment in Ohio. 10 7 There is
no preferential treatment for those that are already doing business or
producing goods in Ohio. 08 Further, no restrictions are being placed on
businesses that operate outside of the state, in whole or in part, to prevent
them from participating in the investment tax credit program.' 0 9 Nothing
about the investment tax credit exhibits the kind of protectionism being
displayed in the above mentioned cases. The investment tax credit is also
not proportionally based on activity that goes on outside the state of Ohio.
Unlike in Westinghouse and Camps Newfound, if a corporation decides not
to invest in Ohio, there is no alteration in the taxes assessed by Ohio.
The essential argument against the Ohio investment tax credit was that
there is a penalty because investing in the state yields a lower effective tax
rate compared to those that invest outside the state.'1 While this might
technically be true, there is no additional tax being placed on out of state
businesses and it is not an actual change in the tax rate. "' Additionally, the
investment tax credit lasts for seven years, at which point corporations pay
the full amount of their taxes. The investment tax credit also lacks the effort
to coerce operations to be focused on serving the state, as was the case in
Camps Newfound. There is no restriction on how much business must be
conducted in the state to be awarded the benefit or to whom the products and
services produced by the new facilities can be supplied." 2 The investment
tax credit merely promotes investment in the state through the tax structure
to any corporation interested, and this ought to be understood as
constitutionally permissible. The benefit provided to those situated in the
state is not being provided at the expense of those outside the state, which
has traditionally been where state taxes and credits have come into conflict
with the dormant Commerce Clause.
SO HOW DID THE ROBERTS COURT DECIDE?

No taxpayer standing-unanimously-in an opinion by the new Chief
Justice with a concurrence by Justice Ginsburg suggesting she favors
broader standing than the Chief was describing. All agreed, however, that
the alleged injury was not "concrete and particularized," but instead a

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1859 (2006).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1859-68.
Id.
Id.
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grievance the taxpayer "suffers in some indefinite way in common with
people generally."' 3 In addition, the injury was not "actual or imminent,"
but instead "conjectural or hypothetical." ' 1 4 As an initial matter, the Chief
Justice found for the Court, it is unclear that tax breaks of the sort at issue
here do in fact deplete the treasury. The very point of the tax benefit is to
spur economic activity, which in turn increases government revenues. 115
Who knows, it might work.
Roberts also reasoned that the plaintiffs' alleged injury was "conjectural
respond to a reduction
or hypothetical" in that it depends on how legislators
116
in revenue, if that is the consequence of the credit:
Establishing injury requires speculating that elected officials will
increase a taxpayer-plaintiff's tax bill to make up a deficit;
establishing redressability requires speculating that abolishing the
challenged credit will redound to the benefit of the taxpayer because
legislators will pass along the supposed increased revenue in the
Neither sort of speculation suffices to
form of tax reductions.
117
support standing.
As the Chief Justice explained,
[The] taxpayer-plaintiff has no right to insist that the government
dispose of any increased revenue it might experience as a result of
his suit by decreasing his tax liability or bolstering programs that
benefit him. To the contrary, the decision of how to allocate any
such savings is the very epitome of a policy judgment committed to
the "broad and legitimate discretion" of lawmakers, which "the
courts cannot presume either to control or to predict." . . . Under
such circumstances, we have no assurance that1 8the asserted injury is
"imminent" -that it is "certainly impending."
To most accounts of the Term, DaimlerChrysler was not of signal
With respect, these commentators failed to grasp John
importance.
The
Roberts's promise of judicial humility or to take it seriously.
investment tax questions remain, and at some point in the future, claimants
with tangible economic injury may raise some of the merits issues anew. In
the meantime, however, the effect is to make state policymakers more
important than Supreme Court Justices-at least in terms of state tax policy.

113.
114.
115.

Id.at 1862.
Id.
Id.

116. Id.
117. Id. at 1862-63.
118.

Id. at 1863.
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State policymakers, no less than their federal counterparts, retain broad
discretion to make "policy decisions" concerning state spending "in different
ways . . . depending on their perceptions of wise state fiscal policy and
myriad other circumstances."' 19 Federal courts may not assume a particular
exercise of this state fiscal discretion in establishing standing. Justiciability
is a subtle matter, and in law school and legal commentary, it has not been
on the front lines. It is, however, essential to the Roberts's Revolution in
favor of the rule of law.
RESTRAINT AND ABORTION

Another, perhaps even more profound, exercise of judicial restraint
12 0
related to the Court's sole abortion case - Ayotte v. PlannedParenthood.
The facial invalidity standard in the abortion context is not the usual,
demanding one, but a highly relaxed standard that in the past has led to
voiding abortion restrictions easily and in their entirety, nationwide. Ayotte
said-if it is reasonable to construe a statute to avoid a narrow aspect of
hypothetical unconstitutionality-in that case the need for a waiver of
parental notice is a bona fide health emergency-then the Court should
construe the statute accordingly. 121
How significant is Ayotte? Does it signify that the Court intends to
regularize the abortion jurisprudence, such that it will now follow the more
customary and demanding standard for proving facial invalidity-namely,
that a law has no conceivable constitutional application? Since at least
Planned Parenthoodv. Casey,1 22 the Court has seemingly applied a standard
that promotes invalidity asking only whether some fraction of the subset of
women affected by a regulation are unduly burdened. In Casey itself, this
invalidated the spousal notice requirement even though an overwhelming
percentage of women either experienced no burden23or fell within one of
several exceptions for an abusive spouse and the like. 1
By contrast, Ayotte stands for three principles: nullify no more of an
unconstitutional law than is necessary, do not rewrite state laws to make
them constitutional, and stay true to the intent of the legislature in passing
the law at issue.124 Ayotte was the last opinion authored for the Court by
Justice O'Connor. It was a fitting end and unanimous, something no other
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
126 S. Ct. 961 (2006).
Id. at 963.
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Id. at 895-98.

124. Ayotte, 126 S. Ct. at 967-69.
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abortion ruling had ever been. That said, this new Roberts's Court approach
of minimalist rulings-never deciding more than is necessary-takes some
mental adjustment.
The opinion with its narrow remedial focus, of course, did not clarify
whether abortion restrictions must always have a health exception-that is,
in emergency and non-emergency situations alike. That is a question on the
Court's horizon as it has heard oral argument
on the constitutionality of the
25
federal law limiting partial birth abortions. 1
Read most broadly, Ayotte could be understood as laying down a new
limit on lower court judges' authority to issue sweeping decisions that
nullify new abortion laws. At a minimum, Ayotte calls for a much more
discrete, refined review of the ways in which a law might be enforced
validly. Some argue this more particularized review casts doubt on the
Court's reliance in Stenberg126 upon an individual doctor's professional
judgment about when a health exception is needed as that practice leaves
virtually no statute limiting abortion free from doubt.
ACHIEVING CONSENSUS

Beyond humility, there was also unanimity. John Roberts promised and
delivered that he would encourage greater consensus and collegiality on the
Court. Unanimity indeed prevailed. 37.7% of the argued cases were
decided unanimously. An additional 12% of the submitted cases were also
decided in a manner where the Justices in their entirety concurred in the
outcome leading to remarkable percentage of roughly 49% of the cases
being decided without dissent. That's a hair shy of half of the Court's
docket, and it is extraordinary. There were also fewer, significantly fewer,
five to four opinions and fewer separate opinions all together-thirty-four
fewer to be exact.
What's the cause of this happiness on the Supreme Court? In part, it is
the conscious desire on the part of John Roberts to issue rulings on the
narrowest possible ground. He said in a university speech that if it was not
necessary to decide, it was not necessary to decide and he would not reach
out for it. 127 On smaller ground, the Justices would be chummier.
In addition, one gets the impression, though only the Justices know for
sure, that the conference proceedings may be allowing a fuller discussion of
the issues and interplay among the Justices themselves. The late Chief
Justice William Rehnquist prided himself on not having what he termed

125. Gonzalez v. Carhart, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 1314 (U.S. Feb.
21, 2006) (No. 05-380) (challenging a federal appeals court ruling striking down that federal ban for
lack of a health exception).
126. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
127. Chief Justice Says His Goal is More Consensus on Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2006, at
A16.
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"1sidebar" discussions around the conference table. Rehnquist preferred for
differences to come out in the writing-the circulation of draft opinions.
Well, differences probably did come out that way, but there was also less
opportunity for agreement. It is human nature that setting something in print
stiffens resistance. Roberts's years as a Supreme Court advocate may be
paying dividends now because his refined skill of effective preparation and
answer also allows-now that he gets to go behind the curtain-this skilled
legal thinker to, in essence, close the deal orally at the conference table.
But is unanimity a good thing? One aspect of the unanimity is to have
presumably more stable opinions. If Senator Specter's conception of "super
stare decisis" means anything, it probably should mean something more
128
when associated with the unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court.
Yet, if unanimity is also premised upon the narrowness of the ruling, is that
actually judicial restraint or merely hiding the ball, as students always
complain of Socratic law professors? It is a worthy proposition to inquire
whether narrow rulings that produce unanimous outcomes, in fact, are
reserving to the Supreme Court more power rather than it is giving it up.
Beyond humility and unanimity, the Roberts's method also seems to
give almost total emphasis to primary legal materials-statutes and casesover the speculations of law reviews. Several scholars have noted fewer
citations to the work of the academy. 129 I have not counted, but if true, it is
perfectly consistent with a model of judicial restraint and anyone who has
read a law review lately would know what I mean.
ENTER ALITO

These are the ingredients of the Roberts's restraint revolution: humility,
unanimity, and primary materials. But, there is one more essential element:
the Honorable Samuel A. Alito, Jr.-the 110th Justice of the United States.
As already noted, Roberts and Alito in year one saw eye-to-eye in over 90%
of the cases in the Term.
Like his restraint revolution counterpart, Sam Alito telegraphed his
approach at his confirmation hearing. Then-Judge Alito explained:

128. Dana Milbank, The Issue Senators Dare Not Speak of by Name, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2005,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/13/AR2005091301127
.html.
129. See, e.g., Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the
Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131, 134-35 (1986); Gregory Scott Crespi,
The Influence of Two Decades of Contract Law Scholarship on Judicial Rulings: An Empirical
Analysis, 57 SMU L. REV. 105, 105 (2004).

I had the good fortune to begin my legal career as a law clerk for a
judge [Leonard Garth] who really epitomized open-mindedness and
fairness. He read the record in detail in every single case that came
before [him]; he insisted on scrupulously following precedents, both
the precedents of the Supreme Court and the decisions of his own
court, the Third Circuit. He taught all of his law clerks that every
case has to be decided on an individual basis. And he really didn't
have much use for any grand theories.13 0
It is fitting to draw these overview remarks about the Roberts's Rookie
Year to a close with Justice Alito's judicial rules of thumb, which, in truth,
elaborate on the elements of the Roberts's restraint revolution - humility,
unanimity, and law. Alito said:
Good judges develop certain habits of mind. One of those habits of
mind is the habit of delaying reaching conclusions until everything
has been considered.
Good judges are always open to the
possibility of changing their minds based on the next brief that they
read, or the next argument that is made by an attorney who is
appearing before them or a comment that is made by a colleague
during the conference on the case, when the judges privately discuss
the case.13'
Justice Alito's first opinion for the Roberts's Court-befittingly
unanimous-gave illustration to these qualities. The Court struck down a
state evidentiary rule barring a criminal defendant from introducing evidence
that someone else committed
the crime. That ruling came in the case of
1 32
Holmes v. South Carolina.
The state had a rule that evidence alleging another person's guilt was
not allowed if the prosecution had offered "strong" physical evidence of the
defendant's guilt.
The state supreme court decided that, when the
prosecution has put on a case with forensic evidence that provided a strong
indication of guilt, evidence about a third party's alleged culpability could
not be admitted because it did not raise a reasonable inference of
innocence.1 33 Writing for the Court, Alito's opinion said that the state rule
focused on the strength of only one party's evidence, and as such,
it could
34
not support a conclusion about the strength of contrary evidence. 1

130. Confirmation Hearingon the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr.to be an Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
56 (2006) (statement of Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr.).
131. Id.
132. 126 S. Ct. 1727 (2006).
133. Id. at 1731.
134. Id. at 1734-35.
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The Alito opinion, alas, did not get much attention. It is perhaps
unsurprising that fair trial rights include the ability to put on a defense, even
when the prosecution looks formidable. Of course, the lack of attention
might have also been traceable to the Court's favorable ruling in behalf of
35
Anna Nicole Smith-a/k/a Vickie Lynn Marshall-the same morning.
The Court found Mrs. Marshall's claim in bankruptcy court to be "alleg[ing]
36
the widely recognized tort of interference with a gift or inheritance."'1
Thus, she was seeking a judgment against her step-son, not the probate or
annulment of a will, said Justice Ginsburg for a unanimous (what else)
Court. "Under our federal system, Texas cannot render its probate courts
exclusively competent to entertain a claim of that genre," even if it does
have exclusive authority over the validity of wills.' 37
A FEW HEADLINES
As mentioned at the outset, this was a landmark Term more for its
changes of personnel than substantive result, but in the presentations and
panels that follow some of the headlines from the past Term that emerge are:
*In the war on terror, the President does not have a blank
check.The question is: was he short-changed?
*Federal-statecases split.
While the late Chief Justice's vision of a more controlled commerce
power remained elusive, states won a number of minor skirmishes. The
states were free to do mid-census re-districting;1 38 to pursue, as discussed,
assisted suicide without federal interference over the drugs used; and given
the ruling in Ayotte, the states may have more latitude for abortion
regulation. The states did not always win, of course. As mentioned earlier,
the Eleventh Amendment was scaled back, both in respect to the bankruptcy
power and also with respect to Title II of the ADA.
*Speech claims did not fare well.
There were a number of intriguing speech and association claims
brought before the Court. These largely did not prevail. Law schools that

135.
136.
137.
138.

Marshall v. Marshall, 126 S. Ct. 1735 (2006).
Id. at 1739.
Id. at 1750.
League of United American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
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did not want to talk to the military but wanted to accept federal money were
told money and military go together, and there is no speech or association
infringement implicated by that combination. 139 In the public workplace,
whistle blowers talking about their job responsibilities are talking outside the
protection of the First Amendment. 140 If you think campaign money is
speech, then the forces of free (spending) speech invalidated Vermont's
attempt at spending and low contribution limits. 141
*The business community was treatedreasonablywell.
There were favorable rulings in the anti-trust and patent areas, but it got
easier to collect on retaliatory discrimination claims. 141
* The criminaljustice search rules were re-calibrated- largely in
law enforcement'sfavor.
The exclusionary rule does not apply to no-knock violations; 143 police
144
can enter a dwelling when they see violent behavior through the window,
45
1
search.
premises
a
to
consent
must
both
but if co-owners are present,
The appointment of Roberts and Alito bring to the Court a partnership in
favor of judicial restraint. This posture supersedes the view of the Court as
divided: liberal, swing vote, conservative. There may still be natural rightleft groupings, with Justices Scalia and Thomas seeing matters differently
than Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Stevens and Breyer. But Roberts's and
Alito's attitude of humility and the new Chief's desire and capability to
achieve unanimity along with Justice Kennedy's free thinking ways should
mean a less ideological Bench overall. And should this prove true, the
strengthening of the rule of law will best summarize Roberts's Rookie Year.
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Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006).
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PROFESSOR KMIEC: Now, as our favorite visiting professor at
Pepperdine, Akhil Amar, takes the podium to discuss the criminal justice
cases, his topic will be introduced by a few comments by Associate Justice
Samuel Alito.
(Video clip shown)'
Enough on the procedure; more on the substance.

1. From Judge Samuel Alito's Confirmation Hearing:
SENATOR RUSS FEINGOLD: Do you think it could ever be constitutional to admit evidence
obtained by torture against an individual who is being charged with a crime?
JUDGE SAMUEL ALITO: The Fifth Amendment prohibits compelled self-incrimination, and it's
long been established that evidence that is obtained through torture is inadmissible in our courts;
that's the governing principle.
SENATOR RUSS FEINGOLD: So, I take it, the answer would be it would not be constitutional to
admit evidence obtained by torture against individuals being charged with a crime.
JUDGE SAMUEL ALITO: In all the contexts that I am familiar with, that would be the answer.
SENATOR RUSS FEINGOLD: Thank you for that answer. I want to follow up one question that
Senator Lahey asked this morning about the constitutionality of executing an innocent person. You
said that the Constitution, of course, is designed to prevent that, and we all agree on that, but let's
say that the trial was procedurally perfect, and there were no legal or constitutional errors, but later
evidence proves that the person convicted was unquestionably innocent. Does that person have a
constitutional right not to be executed?
JUDGE SAMUEL ALITO: The person would first ask to avail himself or herself of the procedures
that Congress has specified for challenging convictions after they've become final. If this individual
has been convicted and has gone through the whole process of direct appeal either in the state system
or in the federal system, then there are procedures. States have procedures for collateral attacks on
federal convictions and on state convictions, and the person would have to go through procedures
that ....

